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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from consolidated subcases that are part of the broader Coeur d’AleneSpokane River basin general stream adjudication. The United States, as trustee for the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe (“Tribe”), filed 353 claims to federal reserved water rights to fulfill the purposes
of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. The State of Idaho and others objected. The District Court of
the Fifth Judicial District (“Water Court”) consolidated the claims related to the Reservation
(consolidated subcase No. 91-7755) and bifurcated the proceedings. In a May 3, 2017 decision,
the Water Court addressed the nature of water rights held in trust for the Tribe. The court left the
quantification of rights for a later phase of litigation.
The United States claimed water rights for the benefit of the Tribe in two general
categories: (1) rights to divert water for consumptive use in irrigation, domestic, commercial, and
industrial applications; and (2) rights to maintain instream flows, lake levels, seeps, springs, and
wetlands for the continuation of traditional tribal practices like hunting, fishing, plant gathering,
recreation, and cultural activities. Both categories of water rights are essential to fulfilling the
purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation—to serve as a permanent homeland for members of
the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.
These categories of claims individually accomplish necessary parts of the Reservation’s
general homeland purpose. Consumptive claims address the water necessary for lands owned by
the United States in trust for the Tribe or for an allottee or for lands owned in fee by the Tribe or
its members, and such claims amount to less than one percent of the total outflow of the Coeur
d’Alene-Spokane River Basin. Domestic usage claims address the water necessary for the
population of the Reservation. Agricultural claims address the water necessary to achieve the
well-established practicably-irrigable acreage standard. Claims for the maintenance of instream
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flows address water for the Tribe’s fishery through maintaining biological requirements of
certain fish species that migrate upstream from Lake Coeur d’Alene to spawn. Finally, the claim
for the maintenance of the level of Lake Coeur d’Alene is measured by the Lake surface’s
natural average elevation at different months of the year.
In its May 3, 2017, decision, the Water Court held that the Coeur d’Alene Tribe is
entitled to a water right for certain “primary purposes” of its Reservation, which was established
via executive order in 1873 after the Tribe and the United States reached an agreement under
which the Tribe would retain a key portion of its aboriginal territory. 1 While the Water Court
rejected the arguments of the United States and the Tribe about the right to use water for certain
other purposes— which are the subject of the United States’ related appeal, See United States’
Br. as Appellant at 10–26 in No. 45382—the court correctly determined that the Tribe holds a
right to use water for hunting, fishing, domestic, and agricultural activities. And while the Water
Court dismissed all claims for maintenance of instream flow in waterways outside the
Reservation’s boundaries—also at issue in the United States’ appeal—it correctly allowed claims
for instream flow within the Reservation to proceed to the next phase of the adjudication.
The State of Idaho appeals the Water Court’s decision, arguing—in conflict with Idaho v.
United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (“Idaho II”)—that the Tribe holds no water right for
subsistence activities because those activities had by that time been abandoned by the time the
present Reservation was created in 1891, and that the Water Court erred by approving instream

1

The Water Court’s decision is the subject of four appeals pending before this Court. In
addition to the instant appeal, see No. 45382 (appeal by the United States); No. 45383 (appeal by
Coeur d’Alene Tribe); No. 45384 (appeal by North Idaho Water Rights Alliance, et al.). These
appeals have a consolidated record on appeal, see R.1–2, but briefing of the appeals is
proceeding separately. Citations to the Clerk’s Record on Appeal prepared jointly for the related
appeals are designated as “R.#.”
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flow claims within the Reservation where the Tribe does not currently own land underlying or
abutting the relevant stream. A group of private objectors has separately appealed from the same
decision, see No. 45384, additionally arguing that the Water Court should have rejected all
claimed rights to groundwater and water for agriculture.
B. Statement of Facts
The Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s aboriginal territory included Lake Coeur d’Alene, the St. Joe
River, and surrounding areas, within a vastly larger area of more than 3.5 million acres in what is
now northern Idaho and northeastern Washington. See Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 265 (detailing the
history of the Tribe and establishment of its Reservation as background to determining that the
United States holds submerged lands within the Reservation in trust for the benefit of the Tribe).
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “Tribal members traditionally used the lake and its
related waterways for food, fiber, transportation, recreation, and cultural activities. The Tribe
depended on submerged lands for everything from water potatoes harvested from the lake to fish
weirs and traps anchored in riverbeds and banks.” Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
The United States acquired title to this area under an 1846 treaty with Great Britain. Id.
As conflicts grew due to increasing settlement by non-Indians into the Tribe’s territory, President
Johnson in 1867 issued an executive order setting aside “a reservation of comparatively modest
size.” Id. Once the Coeur d’Alene became aware of the Order, the Tribe rejected it: “The Tribe
found the 1867 boundaries unsatisfactory, due in part to their failure to make adequate provision
for fishing and other uses of important waterways.” Id. at 266. Accordingly, when the Tribe
petitioned the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for an adequate reservation, “it insisted on a
reservation that included key river valleys because ‘we are not as yet quite up to living on
farming’ ” Id. After further negotiations, the Tribe agreed in 1873 to relinquish all claims to its
aboriginal lands outside the bounds of a larger reservation; in exchange, the United States would
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“set apart and secure” lands “for the exclusive use of the Coeur d’Alene Indians, and to protect
. . . from settlement or occupancy by other persons.” Id. (quoting 1873 agreement). The
reservation boundaries described in the agreement included part of the St. Joe River and nearly
all of Lake Coeur d’Alene. Id.; see also R.1865–67; R.4201–03 (full text of the 1873
Agreement). The 1873 agreement was by its terms not binding without congressional approval,
but later that year “President Grant issued an Executive Order directing that the reservation
specified in the agreement be ‘withdrawn from sale and set apart as a reservation for the Coeur
d’Alene Indians.’ ” Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 266 (quoting Exec. Order of Nov. 8, 1873, reprinted in
1 C. Kapler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 837 (1904)); see also R.1868.
As pressure from the new white settlers intensified and valuable minerals were
discovered in this part of Idaho, Congress sought to make more land available to settlers and
prospectors by altering the boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. After further
negotiations, the United States and Tribe in 1889 negotiated a new agreement under which the
Tribe would cede the northern portion of its reservation in exchange for $500,000. Idaho II, 533
U.S. at 269–70; R.1882–84. Congress ratified this 1889 agreement in 1891, along with an 1887
agreement that had reaffirmed the establishment of the 1873 Reservation. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at
270. While these agreements confirmed the 1873 Reservation and then ceded certain of those
Reservation lands, they did not purport to establish a new reservation, alter the purpose of the
existing Reservation, or abrogate any other tribal rights.
The boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation have remained largely constant since
that time, but control of Reservation lands has evolved, most substantially as a result of the 1906
Indian Appropriations Act, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 335–36 (1906), which authorized allotment of
the Reservation. Under that law, and over vigorous and near-universal objection by the Tribe, see
R.1750–51, each Indian on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation received an allotment of 160 acres,
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and the surplus lands—i.e., those lands not allotted or reserved for common tribal purposes—
were open to settlement by non-Indians. 34 Stat. at 335–37. Application of this law soon caused
non-Indian holdings of Reservation lands to exceed Indian holdings, due both to non-Indian
homesteading and to the loss of Indian allotments resulting from sale, forfeiture, or loss in
mortgage sale. See R.2244–50. The United States subsequently reversed course on that Indian
allotment policy, through enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat.
984. As for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, that significant policy change resulted in the eventual
transfer back to the Tribe of remaining surplus lands (i.e., lands that had not yet been
homesteaded following the 1906 allotment Act). R.3101, 3105; R.799–802. Over the last few
decades, the Tribe has endeavored to reacquire lands alienated from tribal control during
allotment. See R.3108–10.
C. Course of Proceedings
In 2006, the Idaho Legislature approved initiation of the Northern Idaho Adjudication, a
general stream adjudication for the judicial determination of surface and ground water rights in
the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River basin. Idaho Code § 42-1406B. The United States is a party to
the adjudication pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666. The first basin to be
adjudicated by the Water Court is the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River drainage, which includes
the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation. In 2008, the Water Court issued a Commencement Order
for the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin General Adjudication setting forth a process for
filing water right claims. In 2014, the United States filed 353 claims to federal reserved water
rights for the Tribe to fulfill the purposes of the Reservation. See R.8 (United States’ Cover
Letter for Tribal Claims). The Tribe entered an appearance on its own behalf and joined in the
claims. See R.4. In 2015, the court issued an order consolidating all federal claims for water on
the Reservation into one subcase and bifurcating litigation of that subcase into issues of
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entitlement and quantification. R.461–62. The Water Court has thus far considered—and this
appeal involves—only issues of entitlement and of the priority date to be assigned to different
categories of water claims.
The water rights claimed by the United States for the Tribe fall into several categories, all
of which are intended to accomplish the Reservation’s purpose as a permanent homeland for the
Coeur d’Alene Tribe. The United States claimed non-consumptive water rights to support the
Tribe’s hunting, fishing, gathering, cultural practices, transportation, recreation, and related uses.
These claims are for the maintenance of certain flows or levels in Lake Coeur d’Alene and its
associated waterways and for seeps, springs, and wetlands on Reservation lands. These in-situ
water rights allow for the Tribe’s continued traditional activities on Reservation waters, which
require protecting the upstream habitat upon which the Tribe’s fishery depends. The claimed
consumptive water rights would entitle the Tribe to divert water for domestic, agricultural,
municipal, commercial, and industrial uses, which serve the Reservation’s homeland purpose by
supporting basic domestic needs and by aiding in the Tribe’s continued economic development
and self-sufficiency.
Because a tribe’s water rights vest no later than a reservation’s creation, the historical
context of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation’s creation is critical to understanding the nature and
extent of these implied rights. The United States and Tribe retained historians who prepared
reports on the history of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, particularly with respect to the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the Reservation. See R.2627–28 (United States and Coeur d’Alene
Tribe’s Joint Statement of Facts, summarizing expert reports submitted in this case). These
expert reports thoroughly document the Tribe’s historical reliance on waterways for fishing,
hunting, gathering, trade, culture, and general survival from time immemorial through (and
beyond) Reservation creation; the Tribe’s initiation of agriculture on the Reservation; the
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negotiations between the Tribe and various federal representatives and entities leading to the
1873 Agreement, including the Tribe’s firm demand for a reservation with waterways; and the
negotiations that continued after Reservation establishment. See generally R.2632–72. Historical
experts also documented tribal resistance to federal allotment policy and the Tribe’s continued
commitment to fighting for its water resources. R.2671–76. An expert explained the biological
attributes of the fish species that are the focus of the claims for instream flows to protect fish
habitat, as well as why maintenance of fish habitat both within and outside the Reservation’s
boundaries is critical to effectuating the fishing purpose of the Reservation. R.2676–78.
On motions for summary judgment, the United States argued that the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation was established in 1873 to create and maintain a permanent homeland for the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe. The United States relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho
II, which explained the history of the Coeur d’Alene people and the establishment of the
Reservation in holding that the submerged lands beneath navigable waters in the Reservation had
been reserved for the Tribe in the establishment of the Reservation. The United States urged that
the Water Court’s inquiry should center—as did the Supreme Court’s in Idaho II—on the
purposes underlying the establishment of the Reservation via executive order in 1873 and the
Tribe’s uses of the Reservation lands and waters at that time. In support of the claims for
maintenance of instream flows, the United States pointed to the Tribe’s traditional reliance on
the Lake Coeur d’Alene fisheries for subsistence, coupled with the biological reliance of those
fisheries on adequate upstream habitat to carry out their full lifecycle. The fact that the Tribe
does not currently own or control all lands underlying or abutting the streams in which flow is
claimed is not relevant to the reserved water rights determination, because the claim is based on
the Tribe’s established right to fish downstream on Lake Coeur d’Alene, not on underlying or
abutting land ownership.
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The Water Court (Judge Eric J. Wildman) issued its ruling on entitlement on May 3,
2017. R.4310–33. The court rejected the United States’ contention that the establishment of the
Reservation also impliedly reserved all water rights necessary to provide a homeland for the
Tribe. R.4318–20. But the court determined that Tribe holds water rights to facilitate specific
uses of the Reservation, namely, agriculture, domestic use, hunting, and fishing. R.4320–23.
Those hunting and fishing-related water rights included maintenance of instream flows within
the Reservation, maintenance of a particular level of Lake Coeur d’Alene, and maintenance of
springs, seeps, and wetlands on Indian lands within the Reservation. See R.4302.
In this appeal, the State of Idaho argues that the Water Court was wrong to recognize
water rights to facilitate the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s hunting and fishing on its Reservation. As
elaborated below, however, the Water Court’s recognition of this key purpose of the Reservation
should be affirmed. In determining the United States’ entitlement to water for the Tribe, the
Water Court properly focused on the purposes of the Reservation’s establishment in 1873 and the
Tribe’s use of its lands and waters at that time. That inquiry led the Water Court to conclude that
one purpose of the Reservation’s creation—a purpose for which water was impliedly reserved—
was to allow the Tribe to continue its traditional hunting and fishing activities. R.4321–22. The
Court therefore correctly allowed all hunting- and fishing-related claims for waters on the
Reservation to proceed to the quantification phase of this litigation.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented in this appeal by the State of Idaho are:
1.

Whether the Water Court properly focused on the purposes of the Reservation’s

establishment through the President’s 1873 executive order, and whether it correctly determined
that the Reservation’s purpose included continuation of traditional hunting and fishing.
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2.

Whether the Water Court correctly allowed on-Reservation claims for the

maintenance of instream flows to proceed to the quantification phase, without regard to the
specific land ownership underlying or abutting those streams.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court “employs the same
standard of review as the district court.” Pocatello v. State, 180 P.3d 1048, 1051 (Idaho 2008).
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
This Court exercises “free review” over issues of law. Id.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Water Court properly focused its inquiry on the 1873 executive order that
created the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
The Coeur d’Alene Reservation was established by executive order in 1873 as a

permanent homeland for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe. Contrary to the State’s argument, the 1873
executive order created a reservation equally valid as a reservation that might have been created
by an Act of Congress. See, e.g., Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 403 (1896) (“When Indian
reservations were created, either by treaty or executive order, the Indians held the land by the
same character of title, to wit, the right to possess and occupy the lands for the uses and purposes
designated.” (emphasis added)); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963) (“Arizona I”)
(Winters doctrine of implied water rights applies to reservations established by executive order).
With the establishment of this reservation of land, water was also impliedly reserved to make the
Reservation livable as a permanent homeland. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908);
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Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 599. These rights vested no later than when the Reservation was
established. See id. at 600. 2
Because Winters water rights are impliedly reserved by the creation of a tribe’s
reservation, they need not be made explicit at any time during negotiations between a tribe and
the United States, nor need they be expressly indicated in any document formalizing the
reservation. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576–77; United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1397, 1409 (9th
Cir. 1983); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 35
P.3d 68, 75 (Ariz. 2001); Mont. ex rel. Greely v. Confed. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d
754, 764 (Mont. 1985). Instead, these rights are determined through consideration of several
important factors, including the history of the tribe and the reservation at issue, including the
tribe’s traditional practices and its need to maintain itself under changed circumstances; the
language of the treaty, order, or agreement that created the Indian reservation; and the canon of
interpretation requiring agreements between the federal government and Indians to be construed
in a light favorable to the Indians. Colville Confed. Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir.
1981); Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409, 1412; see also Washington v. Wash. State Comm’l Fishing
Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676, 680 (1979); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 200, 206 (1999). Also important to recognize in determining a tribe’s
reserved water rights is that an agreement to confine a tribe to a reservation “was not a grant of
rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them—a reservation of those not granted.” United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905); see also Pocatello, 180 P.3d at 1057; United States

2

Although the adjudication of the federal water right claims is conducted in state court
pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, federal law governs the determination
the federal reserved water rights claims by the United States. See Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 597–98.
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v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353–54 (1941) (creation of Indian reservation protects
any pre-existing possessory rights of the Indians in absence of clear contrary intent).
Against this background, the history of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe and the negotiations
leading to the establishment of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation make clear that hunting and
fishing were two important traditional uses to the Tribe at the time, such that the Tribe retained
them in the establishment of the Reservation. Indeed, the United States may have promoted
agriculture in discussing the establishment of a reservation but the government’s larger and more
immediate goal was securing the Tribe’s agreement to cede vast quantities of its aboriginal lands
and be confined on a reservation. To accomplish this goal, the United States accepted the Tribe’s
demand that it retain waterways that were essential to the Tribe’s traditional way of life. See
Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 266; R.708 (2015 Smith Report); R.1571, 1577–78 (2015 Hart Report). See
generally R.699–713 (2015 Smith Report, describing Tribal opposition to the 1867 boundaries,
the negotiation of the 1873 Agreement, and the executive order establishing the Reservation).
Accordingly, under Winters and its progeny, water was impliedly reserved to accomplish these
traditional uses—along with agriculture and other then-modern uses of land—and these rights
vested at the time of the Reservation’s establishment.
An Act of Congress was not necessary for the establishment of the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation. Once established, however, the Reservation and associated rights could be altered
only by explicit action of Congress. Indeed, unlike recognition of a tribe’s water rights, which
occurs by implication upon establishment of a reservation, abrogation of tribal rights must be
explicit and may not be accomplished through implication or silence. See Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). Although Congress later reduced the size of the
Coeur d’Alene Reservation and allowed for fee ownership of lands within the Reservation
(including by non-Indians), Congress never abrogated the Tribe’s reserved right to use water for
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hunting and fishing. Accordingly, these reserved rights, which relate to the Tribe’s aboriginal
uses, see Winans, 198 U.S. at 381, vested when the Reservation was established in 1873, see
Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600, and continue to be held today.
The Water Court correctly recognized that “the Tribe’s need to access the waterways to
facilitate its traditional fishing and hunting practices” was at “the forefront of” the negotiations
between the Tribe and the federal government for the establishment of a reservation. R.4321.
Crediting the United States’ expert’s findings and the Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho II, 533
U.S. at 266, the court explained that the Tribe was moving toward incorporating agriculture into
its way of life but at the same time continued to rely on hunting and fishing for its survival. The
court acknowledged that the United States fully understood that the Tribe intended to negotiate a
reservation that included waterways for hunting and fishing, and that it was in the United States’
interest to provide those waters to the Tribe to avoid “trouble” while extinguishing tribal claims
to lands within much of the Tribe’s aboriginal territory. R.4322. The court agreed with the
United States that the “history and circumstances surrounding the 1873 agreement and resulting
Executive Order thus establish that” the “very locale and construct of the reservation was tailored
to serve” the purpose of facilitating “traditional fishing and hunting practices.” R.4322. The court
thus correctly recognized that the Coeur d’Alene Tribe holds a reserved right to water for
hunting and fishing with a time immemorial priority date. R.4322, 4326.
The State argues that whatever were the purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation when
established in 1873, Congress rejected those purposes and established a new, superseding
reservation in 1891, intended solely to provide for the Tribe’s agricultural pursuits. The State’s
argument has three crucial defects: first, the Supreme Court of the United States already rejected
the State’s argument in Idaho II, and the State may not relitigate that issue; second, even if that
issue were still open, the State is wrong as a matter of law and fact that Congress either could or
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did so alter the Reservation’s purposes; and third, the State’s argument rests on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the Winters reserved water rights doctrine, which does not support the
State’s theory that changes to the Coeur d’Alene Reservation’s boundaries after establishment
fundamentally altered the purposes of the Reservation.
A. The State may not relitigate its argument that Congress fundamentally redefined
the Coeur d’Alene Reservation in 1891, because the Supreme Court rejected the
very same argument in Idaho II.
The State urges this Court to look to Acts of Congress nearly two decades after the
establishment of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation to determine the purposes for which water was
impliedly reserved for the Reservation. But the State is precluded from making this argument,
which was presented, considered, and rejected by the Supreme Court in Idaho II.
The doctrine of issue preclusion bars “successive litigation of an issue of fact or law
actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even
if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). By “preclud[ing] parties from contesting matters that
they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” this doctrine protects against “the expense
and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[es] judicial resources, and foste[rs] reliance on
judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979). The State’s reliance on this already presented and decided
argument is impermissible based on all five factors that this Court has set forth for determining
whether issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel) bars relitigation of an issue: (1) the
State “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided” in Idaho II; (2) the issue
decided in Idaho II regarding the effect of later Acts of Congress on the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation “was identical to the issue presented” here; (3) the issue “was actually decided” in
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Idaho II; (4) “there was a final judgment on the merits” in Idaho II; and (5) the State “was a
party” to Idaho II. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (Idaho 2007).
The State asserts that Idaho II did not present—and thus the Supreme Court not
consider—any issue beyond the purposes of the 1873 creation of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation,
leaving open the question whether later congressional action “established new purposes for the
diminished reservation.” State Br. 7. 3 The State’s characterization of Idaho II is incorrect: the
Supreme Court specifically considered events surrounding the Reservation’s creation, and it
decided the legal effects of later changes, through and beyond Congress’s 1891 Act altering the
Reservation’s boundaries, see Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1028, because the State
made the very same argument in that case that it does here. Having considered the State’s
argument in that case, the U.S. Supreme Court squarely rejected the theory that the State now
presents to this Court.
The State made the identical argument in Idaho II: While the ultimate issue in Idaho II—
quieting title to land—differs from the water rights issues presented here, the State presented the
very same argument in that case that it attempts to resurrect for this Court’s decision, namely the
extent to which Congress altered the scope of the initial Reservation through subsequent actions.
In Idaho II, the State argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that the United States does not hold
3

The State improperly utilizes the term “diminished” when it asserts that the 1891 Act
approving the 1887 and 1889 Agreements was an act “establishing a diminished reservation.”
State Br. 7, 13. “Diminishment” is a legal term of art in Indian law, and refers to a situation
where more than just an Indian reservation’s boundaries change. Diminishment removes certain
lands from Indian Country jurisdiction. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984). No court has
ruled that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation has been “diminished,” and at no point in this
adjudication has the State even argued that the Reservation has been “diminished.” Instead, the
State misuses this term of art as simply an adjective to refer to the change of the Reservation’s
borders. For this reason, the United States respectfully urges the Court to not use the term
“diminished,” as the implications of that term are broader than the State’s casual usage suggests.
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title to submerged lands within the Reservation in trust for the Tribe because, under the State’s
theory in that case—and now in this case—in 1889, “Congress repudiated the Reservation as it
then existed, directed its diminishment, and drafted its description of the lands to be purchased so
as to avoid any implication that it was recognizing tribal title to the submerged lands.” R.3612
(State’s Brief before Supreme Court in Idaho II (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 980, 1002
(the “1889 Act”))). 4 Thus, the argument went, whatever the United States initially intended
regarding the ownership of submerged lands within the Reservation, later Acts of Congress made
clear that submerged lands would not be retained for the Tribe because “the language of the 1889
Act strongly implies that the primary purpose of the diminished Reservation was to provide lands
to meet the agricultural needs of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe” and thus tribal control of these lands
was “not necessary to fulfill the purposes of the diminished Reservation.” R.3612. The State
argued that the Ninth Circuit had “mischaracterized Congress’ actions” “by holding that
Congress did not ‘repudiate’ the 1873 Executive Order Reservation,” R.3618, and that “the court
of appeals’ failure to explore the purposes of the Reservation, as understood by Congress, is
indefensible,” R.3621.
The State’s argument in this appeal is “identical to the issue presented” to and rejected by
the Supreme Court in Idaho II. Ticor Title Co., 157 P.3d at 618. The State first suggests that the
Water Court’s reliance on the 1873 Agreement and the executive order based on it was improper,

4

The 1889 Act directed negotiation with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe to acquire as much of
its Reservation lands as the Tribe was willing to cede. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 277 (citing Act of
Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 412, § 4, 25 Stat. 1002). That negotiation resulted in the Agreement of 1889,
which was ratified by Congress in 1891. Thus, while the State in Idaho II largely pointed to the
1889 Act directing the negotiation as evidence that Congress rejected the 1873 Reservation and
now points to the 1891 Act ratifying the resulting agreements as evidence that Congress rejected
the 1873 Reservation, this shift of focus does not represent any meaningful change in the State’s
argument.
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State’s Br. 21, and then it argues that during the period that the Tribe and Congress were
negotiating regarding cession of part of the Reservation, the Tribe was interested only in
maintaining its agricultural lands. State’s Br. 22–23. The State reasserts the theory presented to
the U.S. Supreme Court in Idaho II that the Tribe’s apparent silence about the importance of
other activities is evidence that the Tribe accepted a Reservation reduced not only in size, but
also in purpose. State’s Br. 23–24. Under this theory, the only explicit purpose of the 1887 and
1889 Agreements on the part of either Congress or the Tribe was encouraging agriculture, so this
became the new, restrictive purpose of a new reservation. State’s Br. 24. In short, just as in Idaho
II, the State’s argument here is that later congressional Acts rejected and replaced the
Reservation established in 1873 by executive order and fundamentally changed not just the
Reservation’s boundaries but also its purpose.
The Supreme Court actually decided the argument in the United States’ favor: Not only
was the State’s argument the same in Idaho II as it presents again here, the Supreme Court
considered and squarely rejected the State’s argument that Congress unilaterally repudiated and
replaced the 1873 executive order Reservation with Acts of 1889 and 1891. The Court explained
that Congress was aware of the scope of the 1873 Reservation and “clearly intended to redefine
the area of the reservation . . . only by consensual transfer, in exchange for the guarantee that the
Tribe would retain the remainder” of the lands not ceded. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 280–81. “There is
no indication that Congress ever modified its objective of negotiated consensual transfer.” Id.
Congress’s posture is critical: because it understood the 1873 Order as establishing a Reservation
and that it would need the Tribe’s agreement for any change to of that Reservation, any alteration
of the Reservation would need to be express, indicating the agreement by the Tribe. Id. at 277–
78. Put succinctly, the Supreme Court held that in renegotiating the extent of the Tribe’s
Reservation, the “intent . . . was that anything not consensually ceded by the Tribe would remain
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for the Tribe's benefit.” Id. at 278. The Supreme Court found no basis for determining that the
Tribe had agreed to cede its submerged lands, id. at 381–81, as the State argued was a result of
the federal government’s focus on the Tribe’s agricultural pursuits, see R.3621–22.
Simply put, not only did the State present an identical argument in Idaho II to the one it
raises now, the Supreme Court actually decided that issue in the United States’ favor on its way
to finding that the United States holds submerged lands in trust for the Tribe, thus satisfying two
critical factors for issue preclusion to adhere. See Ticor Title Co., 157 P.3d at 618. 5 Because the
Supreme Court considered and rejected that identical argument, the State is precluded from
relitigating that issue in this Court now.
B. To the extent this issue may be relitigated, the State’s argument has no merit.
Even if the State may relitigate whether Congress altogether rejected the 1873
Reservation and replaced it with a new reservation with different purposes, the State’s argument
fails for several reasons.
First, although the State now suggests that the 1873 executive order establishing the
Reservation somehow lacks the imprimatur of a reservation created via another mechanism,
State’s Br. 21, the law is clear that executive-order reservations are no less valid than those
established by other mechanisms. More than a half-century ago, the Supreme Court held that it
gave “short shrift at this late date to the argument that the reservation of either land or water were
invalid because they were originally set apart by the Executive. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 598
5

The State’s argument plainly also satisfies the other requirements of issue preclusion:
the State had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided,” as it devoted much of its
briefing before the U.S. Supreme Court to its later-acts-of-Congress argument; “there was a final
judgment on the merits” in Idaho II, as the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the district
court’s judgment in favor of the United States, United States v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d. 1094,
1117 (D. Idaho 1998); and the State of Idaho “was a party” to Idaho II. See Ticor Title Co., 157
P.3d at 618.
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(emphasis added); accord, e.g., Spalding, 160 U.S. at 403. That Congress has not expressly
confirmed some reservations established by executive order has not been taken to indicate
congressional disapproval; rather, the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed Congress’s acquiescence
in the executive branch’s reservation of lands to support the full lawful effect of such a
reservation. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469–73 (1915). Thus, the 1873
executive order that mirrored an 1873 Agreement between the Coeur d’Alene Tribe and the
United States government did establish the Coeur d’Alene Reservation as a matter of fact and
law. Cf. Idaho Supreme Court: Tribal History, available at https://isc.idaho.gov/tribalstate/tribalhistory (last accessed Mar. 15, 2018) (“The Coeur d’Alene Reservation was
established by Executive Order dated November 8, 1873.”).
Congress could have terminated the Reservation by clear and explicit action to that end.
But the State can identify no such action taken by Congress. Contrary to the State’s argument, in
ratifying the 1887 Agreement, Congress confirmed (rather than rejected) the Reservation that
was established in 1873. The 1887 Agreement referred to the “present Coeur d’Alene
Reservation,” to “the boundaries of” the “present reservation,” and to Indians “now residing on
the Coeur d’Alene Reservation,” R.1873, leaving no question that Congress viewed the
Reservation as then existing and continuing to exist. Congress’s 1888 Resolution seeking
information about the extent of that Reservation provides further confirmation, as it speaks of the
Reservation in present tense, i.e., “the present area of the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation” and
“Indians now on such reservation.” R.1878. And the later-ratified 1889 Agreement likewise
acknowledges not only that the Reservation continues to exist, but also that the Coeur d’Alene
Tribe is entitled to compensation for the portion of the Reservation that it agreed to cede.
R.1882. Nothing in these agreements or in the statutes ratifying them contains any indication that
Congress intended to repudiate, reject, terminate, or replace the Reservation created in 1873, or
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that it intended to terminate or in any way limit the Tribe’s existing water rights or communal
rights to hunting and fishing. The purpose of the 1887 and 1889 Agreements was to purchase
from the Tribe the portions of its Reservation that the Tribe was willing to cede, as well as to
guarantee that Reservation lands would be held forever as a tribal homeland. The size of the
Reservation after ratification of these agreements in 1891 was smaller than before, but the
smaller Reservation was not a new Reservation.
In any event, even if the State were correct that the Reservation’s purposes were
somehow reduced or altered through these later agreements and Congress’s 1891 Act, the State
is incorrect as a matter of fact when it argues that, by this time, the Tribe had accepted that its
Reservation would have only an agricultural purpose. Contrary to the State’s assertion that the
Tribe expressed no concerns about the loss of subsistence hunting and fishing on the ceded lands
and waters during the late-1880s negotiations, State Br. 43, the Tribe in fact expressed great
resistance to ceding parts of its Reservation and did so only in exchange for a guarantee that its
remaining Reservation lands would be “held forever as Indian land and as homes for the Coeur
d’Alene Indians.” R.2665 (emphases added); see also R.1874. “Indian land” has been understood
to indicate the implied right to fish and hunt. See Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 406–07.
The Tribe insisted on these protections in part because subsistence activities remained an
important part of their way of life. See generally R.2669–71 ⁋⁋ 85–88 (United States’ and
Tribe’s Joint Statement of Facts); 6 R.787 (2016 Smith Report describing findings that “even
successful tribal farmers did not rely entirely on agriculture for their subsistence”). The record
establishes that fishing, hunting, and gathering remained important to the Tribe thorough the
years leading to congressional ratification of the Reservation in 1891. Some families continued

6

The State did not object to any of these proposed findings of fact. See R.3374.
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to reside at traditional village sites and continued to rely on hunting and fishing. See R.2670
(citing R.3025 (Wee Report); R.643 (2015 Smith Report); R.1859 (2015 Hart Report); R.788
(2016 Smith Report)). A Department of the Interior report in 1891 explained the difficulty of
obtaining an accurate census of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe because many tribal members had
“gone in to the mountains hunting and fishing which made it impossible to see them all.” R.788
(2016 Smith Report); R.3029 (Wee Report). In short, even if the State were correct that we must
look to the purposes of a supposedly congressionally created new reservation in 1891, rather than
the Reservation created by executive order in 1873, there is no evidence to support the State’s
argument that the purposes of this supposed later reservation excluded the hunting and fishing on
which the Coeur d’Alene had traditionally and still relied. 7 Cf. In re the General Adjudication of
All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 78 (Wyo. 1988) (rejecting
fishing as a purpose of that reservation because it found no “dependency upon fishing for a
livelihood [or] a traditional lifestyle involving fishing”).
In short, just as the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the State’s theory that Congress took a
backhanded approach to “pull a fast one” on the Tribe by unilaterally redefining the Reservation

7

The historical record confirms that these traditional activities persisted long after the
1891 Act. As the State’s historian for this litigation acknowledged, even the “Coeur d’Alene
Indians who seemingly embraced Euro-American style agriculture did not completely abandon
their traditional hunting, fishing, and gathering economy” in the decades that followed. R.3049
(Wee Report). Indeed, testimony about ongoing Tribal use of Reservation waterways for fishing,
hunting, camping, and transportation was entered into 1910 hearings at Interior. R.2670 (citing
R.643, 740–41 (2015 Smith Report); R.789–90 (2016 Smith report); R.1786–1803, R.1859
(2015 Hart Report)). A white farmer reported seeing “Indians camped every place” on the bank
of the St. Joe River “[p]ractically every year” from his settlement at St. Maries, Idaho, in 1884 to
the date of his testimony in 1910, and that he had seen Indians fishing year round for trout.
R.2670 (citing R.789 (2016 Smith Report); R.1791 (2015 Hart Report)). Witnesses reported
seeing fish traps in the rivers during this period, and the Coeur d’Alene hunted for deer and
ducks along rivers, ponds, and marshes. See R.789–90 (2016 Smith Report).
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to exclude submerged lands, Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 278, this Court should reject the State’s effort
to argue that Congress silently and implicitly rejected the broad purposes of the 1873
Reservation and replaced them with a new, more limited, set of purposes never explicitly
contained in any agreement with the Tribe or Act of Congress. To determine the Coeur d’Alene
Tribe’s entitlement to water, this Court should focus its inquiry on the purposes of the 1873
Reservation. As the Water Court correctly set forth, hunting and fishing were activities the Tribe
was not prepared to give up in agreeing to be confined to a reservation. The water rights
implicitly reserved to facilitate these activities arose based on the Tribe’s aboriginal uses, vested
upon the establishment of the Reservation and continue to exist today.
C. Winters does not support the State’s argument that only the 1891 Act is relevant
to determining the Tribe’s entitlement to water.
Finally, the State urges that Winters supports its argument that only Congress’s intention
in ratifying the 1887 and 1889 Agreements is relevant to determining the extent of reserved
water rights held for the Tribe. State Br. 18–20. In doing so, the State misrepresents the legal and
factual context of Winters and misconstrues the scope of the decision.
Winters was not a general stream adjudication, and so the Court had no occasion to
determine the full extent of water rights that inhere to that reservation. Winters presented only
the more limited question whether to enjoin upstream users from damming up water that would
have otherwise flowed down the Milk River to the Fort Belknap Reservation. To determine
whether the Reservation’s creation had an associated water right that would limit upstream use,
the U.S. Supreme Court looked to the circumstances surrounding “the agreement of May, 1888,
resulting in the creation of the Fort Belknap Reservation.” 207 U.S. at 575. This agreement was
key to the Court’s analysis because the upstream and allegedly-senior water diverters had begun
their complained-of activities in 1900. Id. at 567. The Supreme Court had no reason to consider
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whether the Fort Belknap Tribe’s water rights had an even-earlier priority date based on the 1855
Blackfeet Treaty, as that would have made no difference to its ruling on the question before it. 8
Winters similarly had no reason to consider—and did not consider—questions about reserved
water rights for hunting and fishing or water rights in any other waterway other than the Milk
River.
Moreover, if the State were correct that a court should look instead to the last federal
action that changed the boundaries of a reservation when determining the scope of a water right
for that reservation, the Winters Court would have considered an 1895 agreement (ratified in
1896) between the United States and the Fort Belknap Tribes that reduced the boundaries of the
reservation. See Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the Grinnell Agreement). Like the 1889 Agreement with the Coeur d’Alene, the 1895
Grinnell Agreement with the Fort Belknap Tribes ceded reservation lands that held valuable
minerals. Id. That the Winters Court saw no reason to consider this subsequent Agreement and
instead focused on the 1888 Act, 207 U.S. at 576, confirms that—as here—agreements that
simply change a reservation’s boundaries do not as a matter of course also fundamentally change
a reservation’s purpose or redefine reserved water rights. Just as the 1895 Agreement was not a
“change in conditions” that essentially created a “new smaller reservation” at Fort Belknap in
Winters, State Br. 20, the 1889 Agreement with the Coeur d’Alene that similarly reduced the size
of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation cannot be understood to have established a wholly new
8

Congress has explicitly recognized that the 1855 Treaty is in fact the operative
document for determining water rights on the Fort Belknap Reservation. In particular, the statute
confirming the Blackfeet-Montana water rights compact defines the Blackfeet Indian
Reservation as “established by the Treaty of October 17, 1855,” as modified by later agreements,
including the 1888 Act, and it recognizes “equal priority dates” for the water rights of the
Blackfeet and Fort Belknap Reservations. See Blackfeet Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L.
114-322, tit. III, subtit. G §§ 3703(14)(A), 3705(c)(2)(A), 130 Stat. 1628, 1815–16, 1818 (2016).
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reservation. Instead, as the Supreme Court did in Idaho II, this Court should focus on the 1873
Agreement and executive order that did create the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
Finally, the State cites British-American Oil Producing Co v. Board of Equalization, 299
U.S. 159, 164 (1936), to suggest that the 1873 executive order establishing the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation has only second-class status, and that this Court must look only to the 1891 Act and
the agreements it ratified. State Br. 20. First, as explained above (pp. 9, 17–18), Indian
reservations created by executive order are no less valid than those established by other
mechanisms. To the extent British-American Oil conflicts with that premise, it has been
abrogated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions like Arizona I. In any event, British-American
Oil did not concern tribal water rights. Rather, that case addressed a dispute over whether the
state could tax oil and gas production from beneath allotments on the Blackfeet Reservation. In
determining whether Congress had authorized state taxation, the Supreme Court—with minimal
analysis—concluded that it should look to the Blackfeet Reservation’s boundaries after an 1896
Act ceding a portion of that reservation. 299 U.S. at 162. British-American Oil’s analysis of the
1896 Act for the purposes of deciding a taxation issue concerning the Blackfeet Tribe neither
addressed nor sub silentio altered the Winters reserved water rights doctrine. That case has no
bearing on the question of when water rights for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe were implicitly
reserved.
***
The State’s argument that the 1891 Act silently created a new reservation that supplanted
the 1873 Coeur d’Alene Reservation was considered and rejected in Idaho II and finds no
support in the historical record before this Court. The Water Court properly centered its analysis
on the purpose of the 1873 Reservation and reached the well-supported conclusion that the
purpose included facilitating the Tribe’s traditional hunting and fishing practices.
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II.

The Water Court properly allowed on-Reservation instream flow claims to proceed
to the quantification phase of this adjudication; particular ownership of lands
adjacent to the streams has no bearing on the validity of this right to maintain flow.
The United States claimed non-consumptive water rights for the Tribe both within and

outside of the Reservation’s boundaries as needed to maintain the Tribe’s fishery. These nonconsumptive water rights are necessary to maintain the fish species harvested by the Tribe within
its Reservation boundaries, and they are part of the implied reservation of water to facilitate that
use of Reservation resources. The Water Court properly recognized both the importance to the
Tribe of Lake Coeur d’Alene and associated waterways for fishing, and that the United States
“impliedly reserved water rights necessary to fulfill the fishing and hunting purpose of the
Reservation.” R.4322. The Water Court dismissed claims for instream flow outside of the
Reservation’s boundaries, a holding the United States has appealed, but approved the claims
within the Reservation as a matter of course. 9

9

The instream rights claimed here may be understood as concentric circles:

•

In the innermost circle are instream rights on Reservation lands that the Tribe owns or
controls. The State generally disputes the reservation of any water for hunting and
fishing, see supra Section I, but does not otherwise contest the Water Court’s recognition
of Tribal rights to these waters.

•

In the middle circle are the instream rights on Reservation lands that the Tribe does not
own or control. The Water Court recognized these rights, and they are the subject of the
State’s argument here.

•

Finally, the outermost circle represents the off-Reservation instream flow rights that the
Water Court rejected. These are a subject of the United States’ related appeal, No. 45382.
See United States’ Br. as Appellant at 30–38.

The historical and biological basis for all three categories of rights is at heart the same.
Importantly, if the Court rules in the United States’ appeal that off-Reservation instream flow
rights were improperly dismissed, it should likewise affirm the Water Court’s recognition of onReservation rights in this appeal by the State.
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The State argues that the reservation of water for these activities was fatally undermined
when the Reservation was allotted and a majority of Reservation land was eventually transferred
to non-Indians. According to the State, the Tribe’s communal hunting and fishing rights may no
longer be served by waters that flow across non-tribal property within the Reservation.
Understanding the flaws in the State’s argument is assisted by reviewing some of the
different types of water right claims that the United States filed in this adjudication and the legal
and practical bases for them:
•

Consumptive water rights for irrigation: the United States has claimed water to irrigate
Indian lands—those held by the Tribe, individual members, and by the United States in
trust for the Tribe. The claim is made on a practicably-irrigable-acreage basis, so that the
claim is directly tied to the quantity of tribally-owned or -controlled land. See R.10.

•

Non-consumptive rights to maintain wetlands, seeps, and springs: the United States has
claimed rights to maintain water at these features only where the land on which the
feature is located is currently owned by the Tribe, individual members, and by the United
States in trust for the Tribe. These rights are tied to the Tribe’s right to conduct traditional
activities, including hunting and gathering, at these locations. R.11–12.

•

Non-consumptive rights to maintain instream flows: the United States has claimed a right
to maintain adequate flows in streams to support the full life-cycle of fisheries upon
which the Tribe has historically depended. See R.10. These rights are not based on any
claimed right of the Tribe to physically access these upstream waters; instead, they derive
from the Tribe’s uncontested right to fish in Lake Coeur d’Alene and other downstream
waterways.
The State’s argument conflates these three categories. Under the State’s theory, when

parts of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation were allotted following the 1906 Indian Appropriations
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Act, 34 Stat. at 336, “[a]ny rights implied from the setting aside of lands for the Tribe’s
communal use are . . . lost,” including “water rights.” State Br. 28. The allotment policy did
remove from tribal ownership portions of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation’s lands that were
allocated to individual tribal members, and surplus lands were made available for homesteading
by non-Indians. That may also have affected the Tribe’s right to access non-Indian-owned
property on the Reservation to hunt, fish, and gather. But the State errs in concluding that it is
“axiomatic” that all communally-held water rights are extinguished upon reservation allotment,
and that a tribe can have no right to maintain flows in streams that cross or abut non-tribal lands.
See State Br. 28. This Court has rejected that very same argument, and held to the contrary that
where a reservation “was thrown open to settlement” by non-Indians, no express provision in the
law was required to preserve the right to fish, since “[p]rivate ownership of some lands is not
inconsistent with” a tribal right to fish and “anything not specifically granted was retained.” State
v. McConville, 139 P.2d 485, 487 (Idaho 1943).
The Water Court held that water rights to maintain wetlands, springs, and seeps were
extinguished when the lands on which these features are located were transferred to non-Indian
ownership, see R.4474, and that holding is the subject of the United States’ related appeal, see
United States’ Br. as Appellant at 38–42 in No. 45382. But regardless of whether that holding is
correct, the same need not be true for instream flow claims. 10 See State Br. 25. These claims are
premised on the biological needs of a downstream fishery, not on underlying or abutting land
10

The Water Court’s decision on reconsideration states that rights “for instream
purposes” could “be lost through non-use,” because non-Indian successors in interest cannot hold
these rights. R.4474. However, the lands to which the instream flow rights at issue here are
linked are the downstream Tribal lands where the Tribe conducts its fishing, not the lands across
which the waters flow. The United States has claimed only instream flows that are tied to tribal
fishing on Indian lands where there has been no potential loss through non-use by non-Indian
successors.
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ownership. Indeed, even though a portion of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation is now held by nonIndians, the Tribe continues to have exclusive hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the lands
that it continues to own or control within the Reservation, such as the portion of Lake Coeur
d’Alene within Reservation boundaries. Those exclusive rights on lands that the Tribe continues
to own or control within the Reservation are the basis of the instream flows claims, not any
purported right of the Tribe to access these streams, a right to directly regulate the streams as
was, or any express retention of water rights at the time of allotment. The fact that instream flow
rights might affect the use of water by other would-be diverters is of no moment, since the
supremacy of a senior water right-holder’s use is the very point of a prior appropriation water
regime.
A. The instream flow rights are based on the biological necessity of water to meet
the Reservation’s fishing purpose.
Importantly, the State does not dispute the biological basis of the instream flow claims:
that maintenance of upstream habitat is in fact necessary for the sustainability of Lake Coeur
d’Alene’s adfluvial fisheries. See R.594. The specific instream flows claimed for fish habitat are
tied directly to the Tribe’s fishing use and the dependence of that fishery on these streams. The
strong biological basis for these claims stands unchallenged: fisheries scientist Dr. Dudley Reiser
explained that Westslope Cutthroat Trout and Bull Trout—two species that the Tribe historically
harvested, R.2676; R.571—are adfluvial species, which means that their life strategy requires
access to and movement through properly-functioning lake and riverine habitats, R.2677, R.593.
The movements of these species occur without regard to title or political boundaries; they are
instead restrained by physical barriers like natural waterfalls, turbulent rapids, or dewatered
streams. R.2677; R.562. Relevant here, this life history strategy means that these species spend a
substantial part of their lifecycle in Lake Coeur d’Alene, but they also seek suitable spawning
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habitat by migrating upstream in rivers and streams both on and off-Reservation. See R.2676;
R.577–78. 11 Young fish continue to live in these upstream areas for years before migrating back
downstream to the Lake. R.2676; R.577. These spawning areas are widely distributed within the
Coeur d’Alene Basin: fish may travel from a few miles to more than a hundred miles in search of
suitable spawning habitat. R.578. Beyond providing required habitat for the adfluvial fish that
are part of the Coeur d’Alene fisheries, these connected rivers and streams also support
subpopulations of these species that contribute genetic diversity and thus help ensure survival of
the fish population as a whole. R.593. Collectively, the watersheds represented in the instream
flow claims are waters upon which the Coeur d’Alene Tribe traditionally relied for fishing. See
R.561–64.
It is this use of water by the fish species subject to the Tribe’s on-Reservation fishing
right, and not title to land, that supports a claim to impliedly-reserved water rights under
Winters. 12 The Water Court correctly recognized that fishing was an essential tribal use of the
Reservation, and that water was impliedly reserved to serve that use. R.4322. The instream flow
claims are intended to ensure that this recognized purpose of the Reservation is not compromised
11

As noted above, the Water Court dismissed all instream flow claims outside of the
Reservation’s current boundaries. The United States has appealed this holding in its related
appeal, No. 45382. See United States’ Br. as Appellant at 30–38.
12

This concept is by no means unique to federal reserved water rights. Use, not title, is
likewise the basis for obtaining a private water right under a state law prior appropriation system.
See, e.g. Idaho Code § 42-101 (providing for water rights to be established through “beneficial
use”). This Court has expressly rejected the doctrine of riparian rights, which rests on ownership
of lands along a waterway, as in conflict with this State’s prior appropriation regime, which is
based on use. Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 101 P. 1059, 1062 (Idaho 1909) (“A
riparian proprietor in the state of Idaho has no right in or claim to the waters of a stream flowing
by or through his lands that he can successfully assert as being prior or superior to the rights and
claims of one who has appropriated or diverted the water of the stream and is applying it to a
beneficial use.”).
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by loss of adequate water flows upon which the fishery depends. R.10. The Tribe historically
depended and still depends on these fish species, see R.2676; R.562–63, and these species
correspondingly depend for spawning on these waterways, including rivers, streams, and
portions of Lake Coeur d’Alene where the Tribe does not necessarily own the submerged or
adjacent lands, see R.594. Thus, even though the Water Court’s undertook a flawed application
of federal water rights law in other respects (as addressed in the United States’ appeal), it
properly approved instream flow claims within the Reservation because they serve part of the
Reservation’s core purpose.
B. The instream flow water claims are not based on a claimed right to hunt and fish
on or to regulate non-tribal lands.
The State insists that because the 1906 Act that allowed allotment of the Reservation did
not explicitly “hold back communal water rights for fish habitat,” State Br. 30, these rights have
been lost. This argument misrepresents the effect of the Allotment Act and contravenes the
established presumption that Indian rights are not lost except where Congress considers their
existence and clearly cedes or revokes them. See Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. 404. That Act did
not purport to extinguish tribal water rights and did not affect the Tribe’s right to fish in its own
waters. This type of wholesale termination of rights cannot be implied by an Act of Congress;
termination must be explicit to have such an effect. See id.
The State relies primarily on Montana v. United States, State Br. 30–31, which
considered the “narrow” issue whether the Crow Tribe could prohibit non-Indians from hunting
or fishing on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe. 450 U.S. 544, 557
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(1981). 13 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Treaty establishing the Crow Tribe’s reservation
provided the tribe with authority to control hunting and fishing only on lands where the Tribe
exercises “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.” Id. at 558–59. The Court determined
that this language did not provide the tribe with the power to regulate hunting and fishing by
non-Indians on non-Indian-owned land. Id. at 559.
Montana has no relevance to the question presented here, which is whether alienation of
upstream Reservation lands extinguished the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s right to adequate water to
maintain its downstream fishery. The State characterizes the United States’ claim on behalf of
the Tribe as derivative of a claimed tribal right to hunt and fish on non-Indian land or to regulate
non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian land. See State Br. 35–36. But that characterization
is demonstrably incorrect: the United States does not argue that the Coeur d’Alene Tribe has the
right to fish on non-tribal lands, and this case does not involve any assertion of tribal regulatory
authority over non-Indians. Rather, the United States asserts a senior water right for the Tribe
that is necessary to fulfill the fishing purposes of the Reservation—a right that is claimed based
on the Tribe’s right to fish on tribal lands and the biological needs of that fishery. The
recognition of that property interest in water no more improperly regulates nontribal upstream
lands than Winters did by recognizing the seniority of the tribe’s property right there and
enjoining upstream diverters. If there were needed any further reason to reject the State’s
improper reliance on Montana, this case does not present any question of rights explicitly created
by treaty or agreement. Instead it presents an unrelated question about the persistence of Winters

13

The State’s assertion that Montana instead stands for a broad, “common-sense
proposition” about Tribe’s loss of rights on alienated lands, State Br. 31, is unsupported by any
law and is particularly untenable given the decision’s own characterization of the question before
it as “narrow.”
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rights—implied from a reservation’s purpose—in the absence of any express extinguishment of
those rights. Montana is simply inapposite.
The State’s attempted analogy to Montana and other tribal-regulation cases muddies the
difference between “a property right, a servitude, or a regulatory right.” State Br. 35. This Court
has long recognized that a “water right is an independent right and is not a servitude upon some
other thing.” Bennett v. Twin Falls N. Side Land & Water Co., 150 P. 336, 339 (Idaho 1915).
Water rights are fundamentally different from an assertion of regulatory power. Whereas an
entity’s regulatory power will ordinarily be tied in some way to its control over a geographic
area, water rights do not similarly operate. In a prior appropriation regime like Idaho’s, water
rights always have the practical effect of affecting the conduct of others—even those
geographically distant—even though the right-holder holds no “regulatory” power over the other
party. A senior right-holder will always, at least in theory, limit the activities of others on a
hydrologically-connected waterway, because the senior owner’s ability to require the full share
of his water rights may limit the water available for junior right-holders. See, e.g., Moe v.
Harger, 77 P. 645 (Idaho 1904). This is not an assertion of regulatory power, nor is it an
assertion of a right to physically enter those lands; it is simply the consequence of one party
having an established superior water right within a prior appropriation system.
Here too, the Tribe’s right to a continued fishery on tribally-controlled lands implies a
water right that prevents upstream users from dewatering a stream to the extent that it does not
allow water for that fishery. That assertion of reserved water rights does not represent either a
tribal attempt to regulate non-tribal lands or a usurpation of “absolute, unqualified title.” State
Br. 36. It is merely an assertion of a property right like any senior water right-holder might assert
in this State. Montana and its kin provide no support for the State’s argument here.
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Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of State of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977),
is likewise distinguishable. Like Montana, that case involved fishing rights established by a
treaty giving that tribe “exclusive use,” and it addressed the question of regulation of fishing on
non-tribally owned lands. The U.S. Supreme Court held that because the Puyallup Tribe had
alienated virtually all of its Reservation (all but 22 acres of an 18,000-acre reservation),
including all lands abutting the Puyallup River, the Tribe no longer held fishing grounds for its
“exclusive use,” and thus the State of Washington could exercise regulatory control over fishing
in those areas. 433 U.S. at 174–76. The State’s comparison of the present case to Puyallup fails
because of the fundamental difference between the issues presented. This case concerns
recognition of water rights, not a claimed right to regulate fishing. Here, the Tribe’s instream
flow claims are based on its right to fish in tribally-controlled areas, such as the part of Lake
Coeur d’Alene within the Reservation; the Tribe makes no claim of a right to fish on non-tribal
lands.
The State’s reliance on Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), is likewise unavailing. That case also addressed the assertion of
tribal regulation of non-tribally controlled parts of a reservation, and it similarly rests on the
notion that the tribe’s control of its reservation was inextricably tied to its exclusive use of those
lands. Finally, Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1981), holds only that the Yurok Indians
no longer could enter private lands within their reservation to hunt and fish. Once again, the
instream flow rights claimed here are not based on any purported right to fish on private land.
These rights are claimed to support fish populations harvested by the Tribe on tribal lands only.
At bottom, even under the State’s theory, because “the United States retains the lands for the
purpose that is the basis for implying the water right,” State Br. 28—i.e. the lands and waters on
which the Tribe exercises its fishing rights—the water rights persist.

32

C. Courts have recognized instream flow rights even in the absence of total tribal
ownership or control over submerged or adjacent lands.
Disregarding the biological and practical basis of these water rights claims, the State
argues that in order to claim a right to maintain instream flows within the Reservation, some
certain proportion of the land underlying or abutting that stream must be Indian-owned. This
argument finds no supports in the law. The State fails to distinguish the many cases in which
courts have found instream flows all fail, because its cramped reading of these cases wrongly
focuses on the particulars rather than the broad concepts of federal reserved water rights law that
these cases represent.
First, it is well-established that water rights need not be physically tied to the lands or
purpose that they serve. The legal concept of appurtenance is a conceptual, not a physical,
requirement. The Ninth Circuit recently explained this concept in Katie John v. United States,
720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2013), which held that off-reservation waters may be tied to reserved
lands. In so determining, the court found “an apparent consensus that [appurtenancy] does not
mean physical attachment” of water to land. 720 F.3d at 1229–30. Instead, “appurtenancy” has to
do with the “relationship between reserved federal land and the use of the water, not the location
of the water.” Id. at 1230 (emphasis added). 14 This understanding of the appurtenance
requirement accords with the Supreme Court’s recognition of water rights for irrigation of
reservation lands from a water source two miles from the reservation boundary. Arizona v.
California, 376 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1964) (“Arizona II”); see also Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. 128, 141, 147 (1976) (holding that the federal government’s implicit reservation of water
14

The Ninth Circuit’s explanation in Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.
Coachella Valley Water District, 849 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2017), that federally reserved water
rights must be “appurtenant” to, or “attached to,” a reservation did not alter or even test this
holding of Katie John, since Agua Caliente involved groundwater that “underlies” the
reservation at issue there. 849 F.3d at 1271 & n. 10.
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for Devil’s Hole National Monument included “appurtenant water sufficient to maintain the
level” of an underground pool, and affirming an injunction that limited the pumping of
groundwater by private citizens 2.5 miles away from the pool). It also accords with the law
applying to non-Indian private users in this State, which does not require ownership or control
over a stream in order to find those waters “appurtenant” to land not touching the stream. See
Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 156 P.3d 502, 513–14 (Idaho 2007).
Physical adjacency to tribally-owned lands is no more a requirement for an instream-flow
claim than for the irrigation claims in Arizona II and Katie John. In Kittitas Reclamation District
v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District, 763 F.2d 1032, 1033–35 (9th Cir. 1985), for example, the
Yakima Nation sought protection for stream flows that provide salmon spawning habitat. The
Ninth Circuit recognized the need for sufficient water to support the spawning portion of the
salmon’s lifecycle even though the stream flows at issue were 50 miles from the Yakima
Reservation. Id. In the subsequent adjudication of the Yakima River Basin, the state court
confirmed that water rights extend not just within the reservation but even beyond the boundary
of that reservation to support the fishery’s migratory lifecycle. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v.
Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5, slip op. at 9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1994), available at
R.2308. Kittitas involved treaty fishing rights—as opposed to a reservation created with an eye
to providing for fishing on-reservation—yet the concept that water is necessary to the continued
vitality of a fishery is equally applicable here.
The State acknowledges several other instances where the Ninth Circuit has recognized
reserved water rights for instream flows without regard to the specific underlying ownership of
lands across which that stream flows, but its efforts to distinguish each of these cases fail. First,
in Walton, the Ninth Circuit weighed whether the Colville Confederated Tribes held a flowmaintenance right in a stream that flowed across both Indian and non-Indian owned allotments.
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The court determined that because “preservation of the tribe’s access to fishing grounds was one
purpose for the creation of the Coleville Reservation,” the Tribes hold “an implied reservation of
water” to develop and maintain the Tribe’s fishery. 647 F.2d at 48. Just as in this case, while the
fishing grounds at issue were in Omak Lake, the court recognized a tribal right of water in an
upstream creek that was a source of fresh water to the lake and in which the trout spawned. Id.
The decision does not state that the reservation of water is based on tribal ownership of the lower
reaches of the creek at issue, nor on the fact that there is more tribal land along the creek than
non-tribal. Instead, it states that is based simply on the Colville Reservation’s “homeland”
purpose, id. at 47, and the biological needs of that downstream replacement fishery that was part
of that purpose, id. at 48. On this basis, the court recognized a tribal water right that prevents the
non-Indian allotment owner from dewatering the stream and interfering with the tribe’s
downstream fishery. The State attempts to limit the reach of this decision in ways that the
decision does not limit itself. See State Br. 40. But even if the State were correct that the
instream flow approved in Walton technically ended at the edge of the tribally-controlled
allotments, the practical effect of that right would still be to also require maintenance of the flow
across the non-tribally-controlled allotments immediately upstream. 15
The State’s attempt to distinguish Adair, in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
Klamath Tribe continued to hold instream-flow water rights on its former reservation, is also
unavailing. The Klamath Reservation was created by treaty in 1864 and allotted beginning in
1887, with many individual allotments passing into non-Indian ownership over time. 723 F.2d at
1398. Congress enacted the Klamath Termination Act in 1954 and the reservation’s termination
was made final in 1961 when the United States condemned most of the tribal land and made
15

As discussed above (p. 31), this limitation on junior upstream water right-holders is no
different from the limiting effect of a typical private state-law water right.
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payments to individual Indians, which “essentially extinguished the original Klamath
Reservation as a source of tribal property.” Id. The court first determined that a purpose of the
treaty establishing the Klamath Reservation was to provide hunting and fishing rights. Id. at
1409. The court thus readily found that the Tribe held an entitlement that “consists of the right to
prevent other appropriators from depleting the streams water below a protected level” to “further
the Tribe’s hunting and fishing purposes.” Id. at 1411. The State of Oregon and others argued
that regardless whether this right initially existed, the Klamath Termination Act abrogated any
water rights that had accompanied the Tribe’s right to hunt and fish; the court rejected that
argument based on express language of that Act that it did not “abrogate any water rights of the
tribe and its members.” Id. at 1411–12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The State here focuses on the language in the Termination Act, arguing that absent this
type of express preservation of water rights, the allotment of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation did
terminate the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s water rights. See State Br. 38. That focus is a red herring.
The analogous part of the Klamath Reservation’s history to this case is not that reservation’s
termination, it is its allotment. The implication of Adair’s ruling about the effect of the
Termination Act is that Klamath Tribe’s instream flow rights to support hunting and fishing
persisted through allotment and were still intact at the time of the Reservation’s termination
many decades later. The court makes no mention of a loss of tribal rights due to allotment or
transfer of individual allotments to non-Indians. Indeed, the court explains that it could not find
that such rights had been abrogated in the absence of an explicit statement by Congress. Id. at
1412 (citing, e.g., Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 413). Here too, the allotment of the Coeur
d’Alene Reservation had no effect on the Tribe’s water rights that are tied to hunting and fishing
on the parts of the Reservation that it still controls.
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Finally, the State argues that United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash.
1982), rev’d on other grounds, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984), limits the recognition of instream
flows to situations where a tribe owns the lands underlying or the banks of a waterway. That
characterization is incorrect. In Anderson, the district court found a reserved water right to fulfill
the Spokane Indian Reservation’s purposes, which was “to insure the Spokane Indians access to
fishing areas and to fish for food.” 591 F. Supp. at 5. On this basis, the court held that “under the
Winters doctrine the Tribe has the reserved right to sufficient water to preserve fishing in the
Chamokane Creek.” Id. Although the reservation was owned in part by non-Indians, see
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1361, the court made no mention of tribal ownership of submerged lands
when considering whether the Tribe held instream flow rights. The State imagines that the
district court’s holding was actually based on an “unstated assumption” that the Tribe retained
lands underlying or abutting the Creek. State Br. 41. But there is no need to invent an unstated
basis for the court’s recognition of flow rights, because the court was explicit about the source of
those rights: they rights flowed from the reservation’s purpose and the Spokane Tribe’s use of
water for its fishery. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 5. Here, too, it is the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation’s homeland purpose—which encompasses fishing in tribally-controlled areas—and
the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s use of water for its fishery that supports the instream flow rights
claimed within its Reservation.
***
Whether upstream lands were lost from tribal ownership simply has no bearing on
whether the instream flows are still necessary to support fish with a migratory lifecycle. These
flows continue to support Reservation lands held in trust for the Tribe, were never expressly
abrogated, and the Water Court properly approved the United States’ on-Reservation claims for
rights to maintain these flows.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the decision of the Water Court
insofar as it accepted the United States’ water claims tied to hunting and fishing uses, including
the claims for maintenance of instream flows within the Reservation.
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